REFRAMING PRIVACY 2.0 IN ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS
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I. INTRODUCTION
With the booming popularity of Online Social Networks
(“OSNs”), a tremendous number of users share personal information, activities, opinions, photos, and videos on OSNs, which is giving
rise to growing privacy concerns among various stakeholders, including providers of OSNs, marketers, and other users on the social networking sites. OSNs brought the voluntary disclosure of personal data to the mainstream, thus exposing users’ published information
1
with potential abuse. Privacy concerns pertain to the acquisition of
personal data and the potential risks that users may experience over
2
the possible privacy breaches. At the same time, despite the presence of some privacy norms and regulations, there are relatively few
well-established institutional rules and contracts governing OSNs,
which gives rise to opportunism.
An additional dimension that represents the complexity of studying privacy risks in the context of OSNs is added by the highly dynamic social interactions with rich data exchange. Users are actively
creating content that not only reveals their own identities but also
connects with their “friends” (e.g., tagging a friend in an image or
linking to a friend’s personal profile in a wall post). Such interpersonal nature of data sharing activities raises some new privacy challenges because users and their social ties share responsibilities for
*
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See Spencer Kelly, Identity ‘at Risk’ on Facebook, BBC NEWS (May 1, 2008),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/click_online/7375772.stm (explaining how
seemingly innocuous Facebook applications can collect personal user details without the
user knowing).
See Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy in Electronic Commerce and the Economics of Immediate Gratification, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH ACM CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (2004),
available at http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/papers/privacy-gratification.pdf (discussing common online consumer privacy concerns).
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keeping their shared data safe and private. Even if some users think
they have tight privacy settings, their personal information could be
accessed or misused by unauthorized parties due to their friends’ ig3
norance of privacy and security. The need for collective privacy
management arises due to the inability to monitor others on the network and uncertainty about their behaviors.
To address the acute concerns for collective information privacy
in the context of OSNs, this Article aims to add to the growing privacy literature by exploring conceptual underpinnings of privacy in the
context of OSNs, identifying privacy management strategies, and discussing major drivers and impediments of information disclosure.
This Article contributes to existing privacy research in several important ways. First, rather than drawing on a single theoretical lens, I try
to build upon previous literature from multiple theoretical lenses to
create a common understanding of individuals’ information disclosure or withholding behavior in the context of OSNs. The synthesis
of privacy literature, bounded rationality theory, control agency
theory, and social contract theory may provide a rich understanding
of the major drivers and impediments of information disclosure in
the context of OSNs.
Second, although several studies have reported growing privacy
4
concerns, recent research has identified the phenomenon of “privacy paradox” that individuals express privacy worries but behave in
5
ways that contradict their statements. In the context of OSNs, such a
privacy attitude/behavior dichotomy is more apparent. While “inva3

4

5

Na Wang et al., Third-Party Apps on Facebook: Privacy and the Illusion of Control, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH ACM SYMPOSIUM ON COMPUTER HUMAN INTERACTION FOR
MANAGEMENT OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (2011), available at http://people.ischool.b
erkeley.edu/~jensg/research/paper/Grossklags-CHIMIT11.pdf (“If the user is not diligent about setting secure privacy settings, the apps may be able to access his/her friends’
information. This is especially unfair for his/her friends who may be proactive and try to
make smart privacy choices.”).
Alessandro Acquisti & Ralph Gross, Imagined Communities: Awareness, Information Sharing,
and Privacy on the Facebook, PET (2006), available at http://dataprivacylab.org/dataprivacy
/projects/facebook/facebook2.pdf (citing “privacy policy” as a “highly important issue in
the public debate by our respondents” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Christopher
M. Hoadley et al., Privacy as Information Access and Illusory Control: The Case of the Facebook
News Feed Privacy Outcry, 9 ELECTRONIC COM. RES. & APPLICATIONS 50, 55 (2010) (discussing users’ perceptions that easier access to information leads to a decrease in one’s control over personal information).
Acquisti, supra note 2, at 1 (“Even privacy concerned individuals are willing to trade-off
privacy for convenience, or bargain the release of very personal information in exchange
for relatively small rewards.”); Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality in Individual Decision Making, IEEE SEC. & PRIVACY, Jan./Feb. 2005, at 26, 29 (“[R]ecent
surveys, anecdotal evidence, and experiments have highlighted an apparent dichotomy
between privacy attitudes and actual behavior.”).
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sion of privacy” shockwaves flood the headlines of newspapers, allegedly “angry users” are still uploading their work histories to LinkedIn, or their photos to Flickr, or updating their relationship statuses
to Facebook, choosing to connect their online identities with these
key pieces of personal information. This Article contributes to this
controversial issue by addressing the inconsistencies in individual privacy decisions from the bounded rationality and optimistic bias theoretical perspectives.
In what follows, the Article begins with a discussion of the conceptual underpinnings of privacy in the context of OSNs. Next, the control agency theory in the psychology literature is applied in order to
identify privacy management strategies. The impacts of trust in OSNs
providers and trust in social ties are also examined. Important postulates from theories in bounded rationality, optimistic bias, control
agency, and social contract are synthesized into a theoretical framework. The Article concludes with a discussion of theoretical and
practical implications.
II. PRIVACY: A MULTIFACETED CONCEPT
Various definitions of privacy have been given in the literature.
The conceptualizations of privacy range from a “right to be let alone”
6
7
in law, to a “state of limited access” in philosophy, to the control
8
over information about one’s self in social sciences. Such a variety of
conceptualizations of privacy leads Solove to note that privacy is “in
9
disarray,” and “[n]obody can articulate what it means.” Numerous
efforts have been devoted by privacy scholars to develop a consistent
conceptualization of privacy and bring together the different pers10
pectives.
6
7
8
9
10



Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195
(1890) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Ferdinand David Schoeman, Preface to PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN
ANTHOLOGY 3 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984).
ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).
Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 477 (2006).
See generally Giovanni Iachello & Jason Hong, End-User Privacy in Human-Computer Interaction, 1 FOUNDS. & TRENDS IN HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION 1, 1–137 (2007), available at
http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~jasonh/publications/fnt-end-user-privacy-in-human-computerinteraction-final.pdf (summarizing research on privacy in Human-Computer Interaction
and charting future research trends while noting areas that are “timely but lagging”);
Clinton D. Lanier, Jr. & Amit Saini, Understanding Consumer Privacy: A Review and Future
Directions, 12 ACAD. OF MARKETING SCI. REV., no. 2, 2008, at 1–48, available at
http://www.kommunikationsforum.dk/Profiler/ProfileFolders/Kkort/Understanding.p
df (providing a general understanding on the concept of privacy while reviewing literature on consumer privacy and suggesting future research directions that will expand the
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The prior body of conceptual exploration has led to welcome efforts to synthesize various perspectives and identify common ground.
Toward this end, Solove describes privacy as “a shorthand umbrella
term” for a related web of privacy problems resulting from informa11
tion collection, processing, dissemination, and invasion activities.
He discusses what conditions reduce privacy by developing a taxonomy of information processing and dissemination activities, which
maps out various types of problems and harms that constitute privacy
violations. Solove’s groundwork for a pluralistic conception of privacy differentiates the concept of privacy (as an individual state) from
the management of privacy (arising from organizational information
12
processing activities). In this Article, rather than drawing on a monolithic concept of privacy from a single theoretical lens, I attempt to
integrate multiple theoretical lenses to develop a common understanding of information privacy in the context of OSNs.
A. Privacy as Control vs. Privacy as Restricted Access
Relating information privacy to the control of personal information is an important perspective found in prior literature, which has
contributed to and stimulated research on privacy as a control-related
13
concept. Wolfe and Laufer suggested that “[t]he need and ability to
exert control over self, objects, spaces, information and behavior is

11
12
13

current understanding); H. Jeff Smith, Tamara Dinev & Heng Xu, Information Privacy Research:
An Interdisciplinary Review, 35 MIS Q. 989–1015 (2011), available at
http://pal.ist.psu.edu/MISQ.pdf (providing an “interdisciplinary review of privacyrelated research in order to enable a more cohesive treatment”).
Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 745, 760 (2007).
Id. at 754–60.
See, e.g., Irwin Altman, Privacy Regulation: Culturally Universal or Culturally Specific?, 33 J.
SOC. ISSUES, Summer 1977, at 66, 67 (discussing Altman’s “conceptualization of privacy as
the selective control of access to the self”); Carl Anderson Johnson, Privacy as Personal
Control (1), in 2 MAN-ENVIRONMENT INTERACTIONS: EVALUATIONS AND APPLICATIONS 83
(Daniel H. Carson ed., 1974) (observing that many behavioral scientists recognize that
personal control is central to “[a]ny adequate conceptualization of privacy”); Robert S.
Laufer et al., Some Analytic Dimensions of Privacy, in ARCHITECTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 353, 360–
61 (Rikard Küller ed., 1973) (describing control as “a critical element in any conception
of privacy,” and explaining that “[t]here are at least three aspects of control which are related to privacy: control over choice, control over access, and control over stimulation”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also WESTIN, supra note 8, at 7 (defining privacy
as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when,
how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others”).
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[a] critical” element in any concept of privacy. This view of control
in justifying the concept of privacy is also found in a number of con15
sumer privacy studies. For instance, consumers perceive information disclosure as less privacy-invasive when they believe that they will
16
be able “to control future use of the information.” This stream of
privacy literature indicates that control should be one of the key factors that “provides the greatest degree of explanation for privacy con17
cern[s].”
While control has received attention as the common core of definitions of privacy, researchers in philosophy and some branches of
social science have noted that it is important to distinguish the con18
cept of privacy from the notion of control. “According to DeCew,

14

15

16

17

18



Maxine Wolfe & Robert Laufer, The Concept of Privacy in Childhood and Adolescence, in 2
MAN-ENVIRONMENT INTERACTIONS: EVALUATIONS AND APPLICATIONS 29, 31 (Daniel H.
Carson ed., 1974).
See, e.g., Cathy Goodwin, Privacy: Recognition of a Consumer Right, J. PUB. POL’Y &
MARKETING, Spring 1991, at 149, 149–50 (explaining that “consumer privacy concerns
two dimensions,” both of which are related to control, and that “control has been included in definitions of privacy offered by” researchers in many fields); Glen J. Nowak &
Joseph Phelps, Direct Marketing and the Use of Individual-Level Consumer Information: Determining How and When “Privacy” Matters, J. DIRECT MARKETING Fall 1997, at 94, 96–97 (observing that “the evolution of the privacy construct suggests that there are at least three
conceptualizations that have considerable relevance for direct marketers’ consumer information practices,” and recognizing that control at least plays a role in the second); Joseph Phelps et al., Privacy Concerns and Consumer Willingness to Provide Personal Information,
19 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 27, 28–29 (2000) (explaining that privacy “encompasses at
least four different dimensions,” all of which connect with “information control”); Kim
Bartel Sheehan & Mariea Grubbs Hoy, Dimensions of Privacy Concern Among Online Consumers, 19 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING. 62, 63 (2000) (explaining that the “predominant influences on the degree to which consumers experience privacy concern” both involve
control).
Mary J. Culnan & Pamela K. Armstrong, Information Privacy Concerns, Procedural Fairness,
and Impersonal Trust: An Empirical Investigation, 10 ORG. SCI. 104, 106 (1999) (explaining
when “individuals are less likely to perceive information collection procedures as privacyinvasive”).
Sheehan & Hoy, supra note 15, at 69.
See, e.g., Stephen T. Margulis, On the Status and Contribution of Westin’s and Altman’s Theories
of Privacy, 59 J. SOC. ISSUES 411, 424 (2003) (noting that “[e]ven though control is featured in many privacy theories, few have systematically integrated the control literature
into their theories”); Stephen T. Margulis, Privacy as a Social Issue and Behavioral Concept, 59 J. SOC. ISSUES 243, 245 (2003) (observing that an earlier definition of privacy Marguils offered, which involved “control over transactions,” failed to distinguish between the
various types of transactions—transactions limiting access to self, to groups, or to organizations); Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1153–55 (2002)
(concluding that “[t]he conception of privacy as control over information only partially
captures the problem” created by the collection and use of personal information, and arguing for a “bottom-up” conceptualization of privacy); Herman T. Tavani, Philosophical
Theories of Privacy: Implications for an Adequate Online Privacy Policy, 38 METAPHIL. 1, 2
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we often lose control over information in ways that do not involve an
19
invasion of our privacy.” Following such perspective, Waldo et al.
argue that “control over information cannot be the exclusive defining
20
characteristic of privacy,” and privacy is more than control. Such
limitation in the conceptualization of privacy as control spurred the
formulation of a modified notion of privacy as restricted access, which
conceptualizes privacy as “[a] condition of limited access to identifia21
ble information about individuals.”
Tavani and Moor state that
“[t]he concept of privacy itself is best defined in terms of restricted
22
access, not control.”
In this Article, I argue that neither control nor restricted access
perspectives alone can justify the concept of privacy in OSNs. Instead, privacy is a multifaceted concept that should be analyzed with
the following considerations: i) degree of control over information
release, and ii) degree of ease of information access by others. The
event of the Facebook News Feed privacy outcry provided preliminary
support for such distinction between perceived control over information release and perceived ease of access: although the Facebook’s
old (without the News Feed features) and new (with the News Feed
features) “interfaces are isomorphic in terms of actual control over”
information release and dissemination, “[t]he introduction of the
23
News Feed . . . enhances the ease of access” to shared data. Hence,
it “increases the perceived probability that those data will be accessed
by more audiences, which in turn leads to a lower control perception
24
over personal information.”
The theoretical distinction between control over information release
and ease of information access seems readily understood. However,

19
20

21
22
23
24

(2007) (organizing the “classic . . . philosophical and legal theories of privacy . . . into
four broad categories,” only one of which explicitly involves control).
See Solove, supra note 18, at 1114 (citing JUDITH WAGNER DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY:
LAW, ETHICS, AND THE RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 53 (1997)).
See COMM. ON PRIVACY IN THE INFO. AGE, ENGAGING PRIVACY AND INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY IN A DIGITAL AGE 61 (James Waldo et al. eds., 2007). Waldo et al. explain
why the notion of “privacy as control” is misleading by presenting a situation where a person chose “to reveal intimate details of his life on national television.” Id. Based on the
notion of “privacy as control,” such a person could not claim that a privacy violation has
occurred in such a situation (because the person chose to reveal those details). Id. But
our intuitions would say that this person had less privacy, under a “‘privacy as restricted
access’ theory.” Id.
H. Jeff Smith, Privacy Policies and Practices: Inside the Organizational Maze, COMMS. ACM,
Dec. 1993, at 104, 106.
Herman T. Tavani & James H. Moor, Privacy Protection, Control of Information and PrivacyEnhancing Technologies, COMPUTERS & SOC’Y, Mar. 2001, at 6.
See Hoadley et al., supra note 4, at 57.
Id.
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most users in everyday practice may conflate these two dimensions by
having an “illusion” of control over the information they reveal: since
they have control over the information release, they believe they also
25
have control over others’ access to that information. In this Article,
I argue that such “illusion” of control could be explained by the optimistic bias where users overestimate their control over information release and meanwhile underestimate the future invisible access to
26
their revealed information by others. To provide a richer conceptual description of privacy, this Article demonstrates the theoretical
contribution of the optimistic bias to the understanding of privacy.
B. Role of Optimistic Bias
The above two perspectives (privacy as control vs. privacy as restricted access) complement each other and reveal different but interrelated approaches to conceptualizing privacy. When looking
across these different aspects, I propose that an individual’s perceived
privacy in the context of OSNs is better viewed as a multifaceted concept that is analyzed with the following considerations:
i) the extent to which users can control the disclosure and dissemination of their personal information (perceived control over information release),
ii) the degree of ease with which their online profiles and their
personal information are visible and exposed to others (perceived
ease of information access), and
iii) the subjective estimation of control over their information release as well as the future access to their revealed information by others (optimistic bias).
People tend to assign a higher probability for an event with a positive outcome but assign a lower probability for an event with an unfavorable outcome. This phenomenon has been variously referred to
27
28
29
as unrealistic optimism or optimistic bias or self-favoring bias. Research

25

26

27
28

See Laura Brandimarte et al., Misplaced Confidences: Privacy and the Control Paradox, NINTH
WORKSHOP ON ECON. INFO. SECURITY, June 2010, at 1–3 (explaining that their results
show that individuals have a false sense of control over others’ access to their information
when they have control over the publication of their personal information).
See Neil D. Weinstein & William M. Klein, Unrealistic Optimism: Present and Future, 15 J.
SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1, 2 (1996) (defining optimistic bias as the tendency to underestimate the “likelihood . . . of experiencing negative events”).
See Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 806 (1980) (describing this phenomenon as “unrealistic optimism”).
See Weinstein & Klein, supra note 26, at 2 (describing this phenomenon alternatively as
“optimistic bias” or “unrealistic optimism”).
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has shown that individuals demonstrate this optimistic bias when calculating their vulnerability to unfavorable events in various domains
30
31
such as getting in a car accident or being mugged or being in32
volved in unhealthy behavior. Because measures for estimating the
likelihood of an event occurring in the future are not easily obtaina33
ble, individuals tend to use a comparative likelihood to evaluate
their positions and abilities (e.g., using a peer as comparison target)
34
instead of calculating actual likelihood. With this social comparison
process, individuals aim at finding out whether people perceive their
risk lower or higher than others’ risk, rather than the actual risk. I
believe that similar optimistic bias exists in an individual’s perception
of privacy vulnerability associated with OSNs. As privacy risks are
highly subjective and difficult to quantify, users are likely to evaluate
their privacy risks by engaging in social comparison process. Therefore, I argue that users on OSNs tend to believe that their privacy
risks are lower than that of peers.
In identifying factors that influence optimistic bias in risk perception, researchers have suggested the role of perceived control in influencing the extent of optimistic bias. Perceived control refers to
the extent to which a person believes he is capable of “producing de35
sired and preventing undesired events.” Similar to risk perception,

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

See Vera Hoorens, Self-Favoring Biases for Positive and Negative Characteristics: Independent
Phenomena?, 15 J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 53, 53 (1996) (observing that this phenomenon is “one of a wide variety of self-favoring biases in social comparison”).
See Frank P. McKenna, It Won’t Happen to Me: Unrealistic Optimism or Illusion of Control?, 84
BRITISH J. PSYCHOL. 39, 39–41 (1993) (describing research that has found that people
underestimate the risk of getting in a car accident in part because people believe themselves to be better-than-average drivers).
See Linda S. Perloff & Barbara K. Fetzer, Self-Other Judgments and Perceived Vulnerability to
Victimization, 50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 502, 503–04 (1986) (describing the results of their study demonstrating the tendency of individuals to underestimate the likelihood of being mugged).
See Hoorens, supra note 29, at 62–63 (describing results of a study demonstrating individuals’ tendency to overestimate their likelihood of engaging in healthy behaviors and to
underestimate their likelihood of engaging in unhealthy behaviors, relative to an average
student).
See Alexander J. Rothman et al., Absolute and Relative Biases in Estimations of Personal Risk,
26 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1213, 1214 (1996) (observing that risk statistics are “hard to
locate” especially for population subgroups).
See Perloff & Fetzer, supra note 31, at 502–03 (observing the tendency of individuals to
engage in social comparisons with an average person or peers when estimating the likelihood that a negative life event will occur to them).
See ELLEN A. SKINNER, PERCEIVED CONTROL, MOTIVATION, AND COPING 8 (1995) (explaining that perceived control can be understood as a need for competence, meaning the
ability to control events).
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studies have also found a self-serving tendency in personal control
36
perception, which is called “illusion of control.”
This illusion of control is documented in various situations. For
instance, in daily driving, Svenson found that approximately 80% of
drivers among the study participants believe their driving ability is
37
better than average. Accordingly, I argue that such optimistic bias
exists in one’s perception of information control and information
access on OSNs: users tend to perceive themselves to have a higher
degree of control over information release and a lower degree of information access than their peers do.
A number of studies have supported the linkage between perceived control and risk perception: on one hand, people show higher comparative optimism and less concern when they believe they can
38
exercise control over potential threats. On the other hand, people
perceive themselves as highly vulnerable to dangers when they believe
39
themselves as lacking coping mechanisms. Regarding various privacy threats, if people have a higher level of control beliefs in their information release and in their ability to avoid the potential information access and misuse, then it is reasonable to argue that privacy risk
perceptions would be adjusted downward. Furthermore, it appears
reasonable to argue that if a person’s judgment on his or her ability
to control privacy threats is exaggerated, this illusion of control
would account for the optimistic bias in his or her risk perception.
Thus I argue that the theory of optimistic bias suggests the selfserving tendency in control perception: as individuals’ perceived
control over their personal information increases, they demonstrate a
greater extent of optimistic bias in privacy risk perception. Similarly,
the theory of optimistic bias also suggests the self-serving tendency in
perceived ease of information access: as users’ perceptions of others’
36

37
38

39

See Ellen J. Langer, The Illusion of Control, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 311, 327
(1975) (studying the phenomenon of control illusion and concluding that when certain
factors were present, individuals were overly confident and more willing to take risks).
Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful than Our Fellow Drivers?, 47 ACTA
PSYCHOLOGICA 143, 146 (1981).
Peter Harris, Sufficient Grounds for Optimism?: The Relationship Between Perceived Controllability and Optimistic Bias, 15 J. SOC. & CLIN. PSYCHOL. 9, 11–12 (1996) (suggesting that perceived controllability and optimistic bias are associated); Cynthia T.F. Klein & Marie Helweg-Larsen, Perceived Control and the Optimistic Bias: A Meta-Analytic Review, 17 PSYCHOL. &
HEALTH 437, 437–38 (2002) (investigating the linkage between perceived control association and optimistic bias by looking at twenty research studies).
Elizabeth M. Ozer & Albert Bandura, Mechanisms Governing Empowerment Effects: A SelfEfficacy Analysis, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 472, 472–73 (1990) (investigating the
psychology of increased personal empowerment through a study of women enrolled in
community self-defense programs).
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access to their revealed information decrease, they demonstrate a
greater extent of optimistic bias in privacy risk perceptions.
III. PRIVACY DECISION MAKING: RATIONAL CHOICE VS. BOUNDED
RATIONALITY
A. Privacy Calculus
Within the robust body of research that attempts to understand
individual privacy decision making, it has been found that the calculus
perspective (i.e., economic cost-benefit analysis) of information exchange is “the most useful framework for analyzing contemporary
40
consumer privacy concerns.” This perspective reflects an implicit
41
understanding that privacy can be interpreted in “economic terms.”
That is to say, “individuals should be willing to disclose personal information in exchange for some economic or social benefit subject to
an assessment that their personal information will be subsequently
used fairly and they will not suffer negative consequences in the fu42
ture.” This calculus perspective of information exchange is especial43
ly apparent in recent research analyzing consumer privacy concerns.
That is to say, consumers often calculate the value of the benefit being offered in exchange for their personal information in the deci44
sion making process of an information disclosure.

40
41

42
43

44



Mary J. Culnan & Robert J. Bies, Consumer Privacy: Balancing Economic and Justice Considerations, 59 J. SOC. ISSUES 323, 326 (2003).
Peter H. Klopfer & Daniel I. Rubenstein, The Concept Privacy and Its Biological Basis, 33 J.
SOC. ISSUES 52, 64 (1977) (discussing the degree to which privacy can be considered in
terms of cost/benefit analysis).
Culnan & Bies, supra note 40, at 326–27.
Id. at 327; Mary J. Culnan & Pamela K. Armstrong, Information Privacy Concerns, Procedural
Fairness, and Impersonal Trust: An Empirical Investigation, 10 ORG. SCI. 104, 104, 106 (1999)
(hypothesizing that consumers will be more willing to disclose personal information to be
used for marketing when their concerns about privacy are addressed by fair procedures);
Han Li et al., Understanding Situational Online Information Disclosure as a Privacy Calculus, 51
J. COMPUTER INFO. SYS., Fall 2010, at 62 (testing how an individual’s decision making on
information disclosure is driven by competing situational benefits and risk factors).
Mary J. Culnan, “How Did They Get My Name?”: An Exploratory Investigation of Consumer Attitudes Toward Secondary Information Use, MIS Q., Sept. 1993, at 341, 344–45, 356 (measuring
reactions towards use of personal information based on relative degrees of sensitivity to
privacy); Cathy Goodwin, Privacy: Recognition of a Consumer Right, 10 J. PUB. POL’Y &
MARKETING 149, 158, 161 (1991) (discussing willingness of consumers to disclose information for research purposes based on what they will receive in return); George R. Milne
& Mary Ellen Gordon, Direct Mail Privacy-Efficiency Trade-Offs Within an Implied Social Contract Framework, 12 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 206, 206–07 (1993) (examining transactions in which consumers provide information about themselves in exchange for offers
that may be of interest to them); Kim Bartel Sheehan & Mariea Grubbs Hoy, Dimensions of
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Coherent with the essential ideas of the privacy calculus, the rational choice theory may further explain how individuals make deci45
sions on information disclosure. This theory suggests that individuals calculate the likely costs and benefits of any engagement before
46
making a decision. Individuals tend to pursue outcomes that maximize positive valences, which can be directly enhanced by benefits
47
provided, and minimize negative valences. Along the line of rational choice theory, a higher level of privacy concerns that are viewed as
negative valences would be expected to negatively influence an individual’s privacy decision making and subsequent information disclosure behavior.
B. Bounded Rationality
Although such a rational choice approach of analyzing privacy
calculus has an intuitive appeal, recent studies have pointed out that
users’ actual privacy behaviors often fail to display the rational trade48
off that the privacy calculus model would suggest. For example,
through an experimental study, Berendt et al. demonstrated that users do not always act in line with their stated privacy preferences, giving away information about themselves without any compelling rea49
son to do so.
Acquisti and his colleagues have elaborated on this phenomenon
of privacy paradox and argued that the dichotomy between privacy
50
attitude and behavior is due to bounded rationality. Because of the

45
46
47

48

49

50



Privacy Concern Among Online Consumers, 19 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 62, 63–64 (2000)
(exploring influences on consumer privacy concerns).
JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOR ch. I (2d ed. 1947).
Id.
Culnan & Bies, supra note 40, at 327; Eugene Stone & Dianna L. Stone, Privacy in Organizations: Theoretical Issues, Research Findings, and Protection Mechanisms, 8 RES. PERSONNEL &
HUM. RESOURCES MGMT. 349 (1990).
Carlos Jensen et al., Privacy Practices of Internet Users: Self-Reports Versus Observed Behavior, 63
INT’L J.HUM.-COMPUTER STUDS. 203, 226 (2005) (discussing how frequently and significantly the rational-choice model fails in the privacy context); Patricia A. Norberg et al.,
The Privacy Paradox: Personal Information Disclosure Intentions Versus Behaviors, 41 J.
CONSUMER AFF. 100, 101, 113, 116 (2007) (investigating the extent to which people intend to disclose and actually disclose personal details during marketing exchanges).
Bettina Berendt et al., Privacy in E-Commerce: Stated Preferences vs. Actual Behavior, COMM.
ACM, Apr. 2005, at 101, 102 (“Findings suggest that, given the right circumstances, online users easily forget about their privacy concerns and communicate even the most personal details without any compelling reason to do so.”).
See Acquisti, supra note 2, at 3 (“[B]ounded rationality refers to the inability to calculate
and compare the magnitudes of payoffs associated with various strategies the individual
may choose in privacy-sensitive situations. It also refers to the inability to process all the
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potential impacts of information processing capacity limitations and
psychological distortions on individual decision making, human
51
agents are unable to have absolute rationality. As pointed out by
Acquisti, the economic literature implies inconsistency of personal
preference over time—future events may be discounted at different
52
discount rates than near-term events. Therefore, bounded rationality may affect privacy decisions: the benefits of disclosing personal information may be immediate (e.g., ease of contacting friends), but
the risk of such information disclosure may be invisible or spread
53
over future periods of time (e.g., identity theft). Individuals may
genuinely want to protect their information privacy, but because of
bounded rationality, they may opt for immediate benefits of information disclosure, rather than carefully calculating long-term risks of in54
formation disclosure.
Based on the above theoretical and empirical evidence, I argue
that an individual’s privacy decision making in the context of OSNs
should encompass the notion of bounded rationality that captures
the difference between knowing a privacy threat and acting on the privacy threat. Therefore, with the availability of immediate benefits in
terms of self-presentation, relationship maintenance, extending social
circles, and increasing popularity on OSNs, users are very likely to opt

51

52

53

54

stochastic information related to risks and probabilities of events leading to privacy costs
and benefits.”); Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 5, at 26 (“The individual decision
process with respect to privacy is affected and hampered by multiple factors. Among
those, incomplete information, bounded rationality, and systemic psychological deviations from rationality suggest that the assumption of perfect rationality might not adequately capture the nuances of an individual’s privacy-sensitive behavior.”).
See generally HERBERT A. SIMON, 1 MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY, at xx (1984) (collecting the author’s various essays on “economic subjects” which, he notes, are “sensitive
to the limits of human rationality . . . [t]hat the concept of bounded rationality enters
early in these essays should occasion no surprise”).
See Acquisti, supra note 2, at 4 (“[I]ndividuals have a tendency to discount ‘hyperbolically’
future costs or benefits. In economics, hyperbolic discounting implies inconsistency of
personal preferences over time—future events may be discounted at different discount
rates than near-term events.” (footnote omitted)).
Id. (“Hyperbolic discounting may affect privacy decisions, for instance when we heavily
discount the (low) probability of (high) future risks such as identity theft.”); Acquisti &
Grossklags, supra note 5, at 31 (“Discounting might also affect privacy behavior . . . . If individuals have time inconsistencies . . . they might easily fall for marketing offers that offer low rewards now and a possibly permanent negative annuity in the future. Moreover,
although they might suffer in every future time period from their earlier mistake, they
might decide against incurring the immediate cost of adopting a privacy technology . . . even when they originally planned to.”).
See Acquisti, supra note 2, at 4 (“[P]eople may genuinely want to protect themselves, but
because of self-control bias, they will not actually take those steps, and opt for immediate
gratification instead.”).
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for instant gratification by discounting the potential risks of information disclosure.
IV. PRIVACY MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES
In the privacy literature, privacy control mechanism has been
mainly understood as the individual choice to opt-in or opt-out from
55
firms’ data collection activities, or as the ability to decide how one’s
56
information is collected, used, and shared. This body of literature’s
focus on individual privacy management, however, makes it too narrow, for it excludes those aspects of privacy management that are
beyond individual choice. Schwartz questions whether individuals
are able to employ meaningful information control in all circumstances, given discrepancies in knowledge and power in the process of
57
data gathering and transfer. The implication is that privacy management is not just a matter for the exercise of individual control but
also an aspect of engineering innovation, group structure, organizational commitment, and social controls (e.g., legislation, regulation,
58
and codes of conduct by professional associations).
To provide a richer conceptual description, I apply the control
agency theory in the psychology literature to the understanding of
privacy management strategies. In particular, the control agency
theory allows us to not only examine the effects of personal control, in
which the self acts as the control agent to manage privacy, but also
include collective control in which a social group acts as the control
agent to manage privacy, as well as proxy control in which powerful

55

56

57

58

See generally Eve M. Caudill & Patrick E. Murphy, Consumer Online Privacy: Legal and Ethical
Issues, 19 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 7, 7–19 (2000) (discussing privacy control on the Internet, especially regarding the choice to opt-in or out of control mechanisms).
See Naresh K. Malhotra et al., Internet Users’ Information Privacy Concerns (IUIPC): The Construct, the Scale, and a Causal Model, 15 INFO. SYS. RES. 336, 338 (2004) (“[A] firm’s collection
of personally identifiable information is perceived to be fair only when the consumer is
granted control over the information and the consumer is informed about the firm’s intended use of the information.”).
See generally Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609,
1612 (1999) (arguing that “the lack of knowledge about personal data use allows the capture of information that might never be generated if individuals had a better sense of the
Internet’s data privacy zones”).
See George Duncan, Privacy by Design, 317 SCI. 1178, 1178 (2007) (“To help balance privacy concerns and the need for personal data, a new paradigm is emerging, in which system
designers conduct privacy risk assessments and incorporate privacy as a fundamental design parameter.”).
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others (such as government and industry regulators) act as the con59
trol agent to protect privacy.
Three paths to protecting privacy can be identified from the control agency theory, which differentiates three types of privacy management strategies. First, perceived control can be raised by having
60
personal control, where the agent of control is the individual. Personal agency suggests that individuals are motivated to act upon op61
portunities that allow them to be the sole initiator of their behavior.
The second type of control is collective control, in which individual
attempts to control the environment as a member of a group or col62
lective. In collective control, responsibility and agency will be dif63
fused among all actors.
Third, perceived control can be amplified by having proxy control,
64
where the agent of control is powerful others. In proxy agency,
“people try by one means or another to get those who have access to
resources or expertise or who wield influence and power to act at
65
their behest to secure the outcomes they desire.”
The privacy literature describes three major approaches to help
protect privacy: individual self-protection, collective privacy protection, and social controls through regulation and codes of conduct by
59

60

61
62
63

64

65

See Albert Bandura, Social Cognitive Theory: An Agentic Perspective, 52 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 1,
13 (2001) (“Social cognitive theory distinguishes among three different modes of human
agency: personal, proxy, and collective.”); see also Susumu Yamaguchi, Culture and Control
Orientations, in THE HANDBOOK OF CULTURE AND PSYCHOLOGY 223 (David Matsumoto ed.,
2001) (discussing the distinctions between “personal control,” “proxy control,” and “collective control”).
See Bandura, supra note 59, at 10 (“Perceived self-efficacy occupies a pivotal role in the
causal structure of social cognitive theory because efficacy beliefs affect adaptation and
chance not only in their own right, but through their impact on other determinants.” (citations omitted)); see also Ellen A. Skinner, A Guide to Constructs of Control, 71 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 549, 558 (1996) (discussing the relationship between personal and perceived control).
See Bandura, supra note 59, at 6 (“[T]he power to originate actions for given purposes is
the key feature of personal agency.”).
See Yamaguchi, supra note 59, at 230 (“In collective control, one attempts to control the environment as a member of a group or collective, which serves as an agent of control.”).
See Bibb Latané et. al., Many Hands Make Light the Work: The Causes and Consequences of
Social Loafing, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 822, 823 (1979) (“Social impact theory
holds that when a person stands as a target of social forces coming from . . . outside the
group, the impact of these forces on any given member should diminish in inverse proportion to the strength, immediacy, and number of group members. Impact is divided
up among the group members, in much the same way that responsibility for helping
seems to be divided among witnesses to an emergency.” (citations omitted)).
See Bandura, supra note 59, at 13 (discussing proxy control generally); Yamaguchi, supra
note 59, at 228–30 (“Proxy control means control by someone else for the benefit of the
person.”).
Bandura, supra note 59, at 13.
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66

professional associations. Below I argue that these approaches fall
into three generic categories based on the type of control agency they
provide.
A. Individual Privacy Management
The first control-enhancing mechanism comprises tools and approaches that allow individuals to protect their information privacy by
directly controlling the flow of their personal information to others.
Individual privacy management is often viewed as a dynamic boundary regulation process, where individuals attempt to balance the privacy-publicity tradeoff among many different genres of information
disclosure in order to assume the proper identity for a given au67
dience. The agent of control in individual privacy management is
the self, and the effects of this mechanism arise due to the opportunity for personal control. When individuals exercise personal control
through individual self-protection actions, they are striving for “pri68
mary control” over their environment. Such a mechanism empowers individuals with primary control over how their personal information may be gathered by merchants and service providers.
In the context of OSNs, prior research describes two types of individual privacy management: behavioral self-protection and technolo69
gical self-protection.
An array of behavioral self-protection approaches has been discussed in terms of choosing a private commucommunication channel (e.g., private messages instead of wall posts
on Facebook), using deliberate wordings and tones in (semi) public
66

67

68

69

H. Jeff Smith et al., Information Privacy Research: An Interdisciplinary Review, 35 MIS Q. 989,
1000–01, 1007 (2011) (discussing the relative merits of each approach to privacy protection).
See Mark S. Ackerman & Lorrie Cranor, Privacy Critics: UI Components to Safeguard Users’
Privacy, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1999 ACM CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN
COMPUTING SYSTEMS (CHI) 258, 258–59 (1999) (discussing privacy as “an information interface problem”); Leysia Palen & Paul Dourish, Unpacking “Privacy” for a Networked World,
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2003 ACM CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING
SYSTEMS (CHI) 129, 131–32, 135 (2003) (discussing the “disclosure boundary” between
“privacy and publicity” and the “identity boundary” between “self and other”).
John R. Weisz et al., Standing Out and Standing In: The Psychology of Control in America and
Japan, 39 AM. PSYCHOL. 955, 955–56 (1984) (discussing that the strategy of primary control is to “influence existing realities” and that the typical targets for causal influence include “environmental circumstances” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
See Hoadley et al., supra note 4, at 50–60 (2010) (exploring changes in Facebook users’
attitudes towards privacy and behavior patterns in light of Facebook’s News Feed and
Mini Feed features); Anna C. Squicciarini et al., CoPE: Enabling Collaborative Privacy Management in Online Social Networks, 62 J. AM. SOC’Y INFO. SCI. & TECH. 521, 523–28 (2011)
(proposing a technological mechanism to support joint management of shared shared
content among users who post content in OSNs).
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posts, avoiding publicizing content that could be problematic, deleting sensitive content (in one’s profile and/or the comments one has
posted elsewhere), untagging photos or place check-ins, and with70
holding sensitive information.
Technological self-protection approaches comprise privacyenhancing technologies (“PETs”) that allow individuals to protect
their privacy by directly controlling the flow of their personal infor71
mation to others. In the context of OSNs, to assuage user perceptions of privacy invasions, a number of social networking sites have
been rolling out privacy control features that provide users with the
means to control the disclosure, access, and use of their personal in72
formation. Some social networking sites even embedded the privacy
control features into the very use of various social networking functions and thus integrated privacy control as part of social networking
73
functionality (e.g., creating social circles on Google+). With various
features that support the functions of specifying privacy preferences
for using different applications on the OSNs, users are able to limit
the amount of personal information disclosed on the OSNs. For example, Facebook users can specify their privacy preferences on who
can see their profiles and personal information, who can search for
them, how they can be contacted, what stories about them get published to their profiles, etc. In sum, these behavioral and technological privacy management strategies could provide users with the
means and capabilities to control information release and limit information access by others and thus may reduce their perceptions of
privacy risks.
B. Collective Privacy Management
The second control-enhancing mechanism is comprised of tools
and approaches that allow individuals to protect privacy as a member
of a group by harnessing group members’ collective privacy know70

71

72
73

See Airi Lampinen et al., We’re in It Together: Interpersonal Management of Disclosure in Social
Network Services, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2011 ACM CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN
COMPUTING SYSTEMS (CHI) 3217, 3217–26 (2011) (identifying social networking site user
concerns and exploring strategies available to users to allay and address these concerns).
Herbert Burkert, Privacy-Enhancing Technologies: Typology, Critique, Vision, in TECHNOLOGY
AND PRIVACY 125 (Philip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997) (“PETs . . . seek to eliminate the use of personal data altogether or to give direct control over revelation of personal information to the person concerned.”).
See Lampinen et al., supra note 70, at 3221–25 (2011) (discussing privacy control strategies on social networks generally).
See A Quick Look at Google+, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/enUS/+/learnmore/index.html#circles (last visited Feb. 14, 2012).

Mar. 2012]

REFRAMING PRIVACY

1093

ledge and preferences to make informed privacy decisions together.
When a user discloses her personal information in OSNs, the personal information moves to a collective domain where the user and her
social ties become co-owners with joint responsibilities for keeping
the information safe and private. Collective privacy management includes interpersonal actions and decisions associated with how information privacy is maintained by a group of individuals who comanage that information. It differs from individual privacy management because of its change of agency (from the self to a group), its
inclusion of interpersonal privacy decision making, and its comanagement of shared information. Collective privacy management
is seen as a process of maintaining social boundaries among many relationships that often overlap and becomes a group issue when the
actions of one individual affect the privacy of another individual.
Prior literature on collective privacy management explores how
different communication technologies—especially social networking
websites—affect collective privacy boundary management among users who co-own and co-manage shared information. This stream of
research often highlights the tension or conflict that an individual
user faces when creating contents that may connect with others’ identities (e.g., uploading an image about a friend, tagging a friend in an
image, or linking to a friend’s personal profile). Such collaborative
activities raise a new set of privacy challenges because a person’s private information can be easily revealed in content created by others.
For example, a study of photo “tagging” and “untagging” on Facebook has exposed the complexities of collective privacy management,
the tensions of content ownership, and the effects that one user uploading and tagging a picture of another can have on the latter’s rela74
tionships with friends, family, employers, etc.
Prior privacy research on OSNs describes behavioral and technological means for users to enact collective privacy practices for co75
managing their shared information and content. These collective
privacy practices comprise strategies or tools that allow individuals
and their social group members collectively acting as the control
agents to exercise collective control over the flow of their shared in74

75

See Andrew Besmer & Heather Richter Lipford, Moving Beyond Untagging: Photo Privacy in
a Tagged World, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 28TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HUMAN
FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS (CHI) 1563, 1568–71 (2010) (discussing the results of a
study in which participants were asked to, among other things, “select a photo they did
not want at least one other person to be able to see and untag or restrict that photograph
on Facebook”).
Id. at 1564; see also Lampinen et al., supra note 70, at 3217–19 (2011) (discussing various
prior studies regarding social network privacy concerns and technology).
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formation. Lampinen et al. identify behavioral strategies for users to
collectively manage their shared information, e.g., negotiating and
agreeing on “rules of thumb” concerning sharing with other users,
asking for approval before disclosing content from those involved,
76
and asking another person to delete content.
In terms of technological strategies, researchers have begun proposing the PETs associated with collective privacy management.
Technical solutions include addressing the conflicting privacy prefe77
rences among multiple content owners, restricting shared content
78
to a selected group of contacts, proposing a user-centric privacy ar79
chitecture to support collaborative privacy practices, developing
technical means to facilitate interactions among co-owners for co80
managing shared content, and promoting collaborative privacy
awareness through facilitating a group’s social collaborations in pri81
For instance, Besmer et al. proposed a
vacy decision making.
friendship-based protection model which facilitates collective privacy
82
management. In their proposed solution, when a privacy-conscious
user makes informed decisions for himself or herself, that privacy setting is in turn used to promote privacy awareness among his or her
83
friends on the same network. In sum, this stream of research ad76
77

78

79

80
81

82
83

Lampinen et al., supra note 70, at 3221–23.
See Anna C. Squicciarini et al., Collective Privacy Management in Social Networks, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 18TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WORLD WIDE WEB 521, 521–
22 (2009) (discussing collaborative privacy management of shared content).
See Mohammad Mannan & Paul C. van Oorschot, Privacy-Enhanced Sharing of Personal Content on the Web, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 17TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WORLD
WIDE WEB 487, 487–88 (2008) (discussing control mechanisms for partially restricting
personal Web content).
See Jan Kolter et al., Collaborative Privacy Management, 29 COMPUTERS & SEC. 580, 581
(2010) (suggesting that a “collaborative privacy community facilitates Internet users to
share privacy-related information about service providers”).
See Squicciarini, supra note 69, at 523–28 (proposing a mechanism to support joint management of shared shared content among users who post content in OSNs).
See Andrew Besmer et al., Social Applications: Exploring A More Secure Framework, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH SYMPOSIUM ON USABLE PRIVACY AND SECURITY (2009) (seeking
to improve the current access control model used by application platforms so that protection is provided while still allowing desirable information access).
Id. at 3.
Taking the example from Besmer et al.’s work to illustrate their friendship-based solution: Bob (the target) is a careless user who does not pay close attention to protecting his
profile privacy and leaves his default application policy to be very permissive. Alice (the
viewer) is Bob’s friend, and she installed a horoscope application which is not installed by
Bob. Alice is security conscious and she set up her application policy to allow access to
only the birth date attributes. The application will now only be able to access Bob’s birth
date when requested by Alice, and nothing more. Alice’s awareness does not only protect
her but it also protects Bob’s profile due to the fact that Alice’s policy is incorporated
when the application attempts to access Bob’s profile. Id.
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dresses the interactional and collective aspects of privacy management, which could provide users with the means and capabilities to
control information release and limit information access in a collective fashion, and thus may reduce their collective concerns for information privacy.
C. Proxy Privacy Management
When exercise of personal control is neither readily available nor
encouraged, people might well relinquish their direct control prefe84
rences and seek “security in proxy control.” Proxy control is an attempt to align oneself with a powerful force in order to gain control
through powerful others when people “do not have enough skills,
knowledge, and power to bring about their desired outcome or avoid
85
an undesired outcome in the environment . . . .” In the privacy context, when users perceive that they lack the resources to directly control their personal information, they may reshape their decisions on
information disclosure by considering the role of powerful others
86
(e.g., legislators) who can act on their privacy benefits. The third
mechanism refers to proxy privacy management where powerful
forces (i.e., legislators or industry self-regulators) act as the control
agents for individuals to exercise proxy control over their personal
information.
Prior privacy research describes two types of proxy privacy man87
agement: industry self-regulation and government regulation. Industry
self-regulation is a commonly used approach that consists of industry
codes and self-policing trade groups and associations (e.g., Direct
Marketing Association) as a means of regulating privacy practices.
Seals of approval such as TRUSTe or certifications are other examples of mechanisms that are designed to confirm adequate privacy
88
compliance. Violation of the codes of conduct can mean revocation
of the privacy seal, or referral to the law authority such as the appro84
85
86

87
88

Albert Bandura, Self-Efficacy Mechanism in Human Agency, 37 AM. PSYCHOL. 122, 142
(1982); Yamaguchi, supra note 59, at 228 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Yamaguchi, supra note 59, at 228–29.
See Heng Xu & Hock-Hai Teo, Alleviating Consumers’ Privacy Concerns in Location-Based Services:
A Psychological Control Perspective, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 25TH ANNUAL
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INFORMATION SYSTEMS 793, 797 (2004) (discussing the
effects of proxy control in the context of location-based services (“LBS”): “when people
perceive that they lack the requisite resources to directly control their personal information disclosed for LBS transactions, they may reshape their decision on using LBS by considering the availability of powerful others who can be induced to act for their benefit”).
Id.
Id.
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priate attorney general’s office or the Federal Trade Commission
89
(“FTC”).
In the privacy literature, the presence of privacy seals have been
found to have a positive effect on the perception of trust in a compa90
ny, resulting in more favorable perceptions toward the privacy
91
statement. However, a number of recent studies uncovered insufficient enforcement power by third-party certification agencies to ensure firms act according to their privacy policies. Miyazaki and
Krishnamurthy reviewed sixty high-traffic websites and found no support for the hypothesis that participation in a seal program is an indi92
cator of better privacy practices.
Government regulation is another mechanism that relies on the
judicial and legislative branches of a government to set and enact
93
laws for privacy protection. The privacy protection standards set by
the government enable individuals to believe that firms will protect
privacy post-contractually, thereby providing individuals with a sense
94
of control over their personal information. Milberg, Smith, and
Burke conducted a survey of 595 internal auditors of the Information
Systems Audit and Control Association (“ISACA”) from nineteen different countries and suggested that, when corporations exhibit loose
management of information privacy, and/or when individual privacy
concerns rise, individuals are more inclined to prefer government in-

89
90

91

92

93

94

Paola Benassi, TRUSTe: An Online Privacy Seal Program, COMM. ACM, Feb. 1999, at 56, 58–
59.
Nora J. Rifon et al., Your Privacy Is Sealed: Effects of Web Privacy Seals on Trust and Personal
Disclosures, 39 J. CONSUMER AFF. 339, 340 (2005) (“Partipants had more favorable perceptions of privacy policies at Web sites that displayed seals . . . .”).
Anthony D. Miyazaki & Sandeep Krishnamurthy, Internet Seals of Approval: Effects on Online
Privacy Policies and Consumer Perceptions, 36 J. CONSUMER AFF. 28, 42 (2002) (suggesting the
“presence of the Internet seal of approval logo was shown to raise consumer perceptions
of the favorableness of a firm’s privacy-related practices”).
Id. at 36–37; see also Robert LaRose & Nora Rifon, Your Privacy is Assured—of Being Disturbed: Websites With and Without Privacy Seals, 8 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 1009, 1023 (2006)
(noting the irony that some studied websites which “publicize[d] their concern for consumer privacy by displaying privacy seals were actually more likely to infringe upon their
visitors’ privacy”).
Peter P. Swire, Markets, Self-Regulation, and Government Enforcement in the Protection of Personal Information, in PRIVACY AND SELF-REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE 3–19 (William
Daley & Larry Irving eds., 1997) (outlining possible alternatives for protection of personal
information).
Zhulei Tang et al., Gaining Trust Through Online Privacy Protection: Self-Regulation, Mandatory Standards, or Caveat Emptor, 24 J. MGMT. INFO. SYS. 153, 159 (2008) (arguing caveat
emptor, combined with government regulation of deceitful claims, will succeed in increasing privacy protection).
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tervention and be distrustful of firm self-regulation. At the society
level, Tang et al. indicate that, although legislations can generally
enhance consumer trust, government interventions may not be socially optimal in all situations because of lower revenue margins for
96
companies and higher costs for consumers. Thus, promoting individual and collective privacy management strategies in the context of
OSNs might be increasingly perceived as a viable substitute for proxy
privacy management approach because of the flexibility to cross international and regulatory boundaries.
V. IMPACTS OF TRUST
A. Trust in Providers of OSNs
The conceptual academic literature in consumer privacy indicates
97
that the Integrative Social Contract Theory (“ISCT”) is particularly
appropriate for understanding the tensions between firms and con98
sumers over information privacy. According to this ISCT perspective, “[a] social contract is initiated, therefore, when there are expectations of social norms (i.e., generally understood obligations) that
99
govern the behavior of those involved.” When consumers provide
personal information to a company and the company in turn offers
some benefits to the consumer, one generally understood obligation
accruing from entering into this social contract is that the firm will

95

96
97

98

99

Sandra J. Milberg et al., Information Privacy: Corporate Management and National Regulation, 11 ORG. SCI. 35, 42–47 (2000) (“[I]f corporations exhibit loose management of information privacy, then individuals are more likely to call for strong privacy laws rather
than allowing corporations to self-regulate . . . .”).
Tang et al., supra note 94, 154–68 (suggesting government regulation is more effective
but less efficient and not optimal for society).
THOMAS DONALDSON & THOMAS W. DUNFEE, TIES THAT BIND: A SOCIAL CONTRACTS
APPROACH TO BUSINESS ETHICS (1999) (explaining the Integrative Social Contract
Theory).
Eve M. Caudill & Patrick E. Murphy, Consumer Online Privacy: Legal and Ethical Issues, 19 J.
PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 7, 8, 12 (2000) (“[C]onsumers have varying degrees of concern
with privacy and place different values on their personal information” and “businesses do
not always compete with consumers’ best interests in mind.”); Mary J. Culnan, Consumer
Awareness of Name Removal Procedures: Implications for Direct Marketing, J. DIRECT
MARKETING, Spring 1995, at 10, 11 (“Integrative social contact theory (ICST) provides a
means for understanding the current tensions between marketers and consumers over
privacy.”); Milne & Gordon, supra note 44, at 212–14 (evaluating proposals to protect
personal information of customers in direct mailing).
Caudill & Murphy, supra note 98, at 14.
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undertake the responsibility to manage consumers’ personal infor100
mation properly.
This [implied social] contract is considered breached if consumers are
unaware information is being collected, if the marketer rents the consumer’s personal information to a third party without permission, or if
consumers are not given an opportunity to remove their names from lists
101
or otherwise restrict the dissemination of personal data about them,

or their information is being shared, or their information is being
102
used for other purposes.
Thus, the social contract on information collection and use requires consumers’ trust on the company’s compliance with this social
103
contract. In the context of OSNs, because of the absence of assurances that the OSN providers will not engage in opportunistic behaviors in terms of information misuse, trust in an OSN provider is crucial in helping users overcome their perceptions of uncertainty. If
the OSN provider is perceived to be caring about users’ information
privacy needs (perceptions of the “benevolence” of the provider),
honest and consistent in its dealing with users’ personal information
(perceptions of the “integrity” of the provider), and capable of pro100

101
102

103

Id.; see also Culnan, supra note 98, at 11 (“When direct marketing is viewed as an implied
social contract, consumers provide personal information in exchange for receiving solicitations and other information, based on an expectation that their personal information
will be managed responsibly.”); George R. Milne, Consumer Participation in Mailing Lists: A
Field Experiment, 16 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 298, 298, 301 (1997) (“[A] social contract
occurs when a customer provides a marketer with personal information at the point of
purchase with the intention that the marketer will use this information to serve the customer better” and “a consumer’s control over his or her personal information is a fundamental component of a fair implied social contract.”); Milne & Gordon, supra note 44,
at 207 (“To enter a social contractual relationship with an organization . . . consumers
must perceive that the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs.”); Phelps et al., supra note
15, at 29 (“[M]arketers should view consumers’ exchange of information as an implied
social contract.” (citations omitted)).
Phelps et al., supra note 15, at 29.
Culnan, supra note 98, at 11–12 (“[I]f a marketer’s practices do not reflect ‘knowledge,
notice, and no,’ the result may be viewed as a consumer information problem.”);
Milne, supra note 100, at 298 (“If the marketer, however, rents the customer’s personal
information to a third party without permission, and the third party sends the customer
unwanted solicitations, this could be a breach of the implied social contract.”).
Caudill & Murphy, supra note 98, at 14–15 (discussing social contract theory in the context of direct marketing on the Internet); Culnan & Bies, supra note 40, at 327
(“[C]reating willingness in consumers to disclose personal information requires that the
second exchange be based on a fair social contract. Developing information practices
that address the perceived risk of disclosure should result in positive experiences with the
organization over time, increasing the consumer’s perceptions that the organization can
be trusted.” (citations omitted)); Donna L. Hoffman et al., Information Privacy in the Marketspace: Implications for the Commercial Uses of Anonymity on the Web, 15 INFO. SOC’Y 129, 133
(1999) (comparing social exchange to economic exchange and asserting that social exchange tends to invoke feelings of trust).
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tecting their personal information (perceptions of the “competence”
of the provider), the level of concern over information privacy may
104
be reduced.
An OSN provider’s interventions with regard to joining privacy
seal programs and introducing privacy-enhancing features, therefore,
should directly build users’ trusting beliefs toward the OSN provider
because of the nontrivial investment of time and resources made by
the OSN provider to design, develop, and implement these privacyenhancing initiatives. These actions should be interpreted as a signal
that the OSN provider is actively addressing users’ privacy concerns
and will comply with the social contract by undertaking the responsibility to manage users’ personal information properly. In other
words, a particular OSN provider’s privacy interventions (e.g., introduction of the privacy enhancing features and joining privacy seal
programs) may increase users’ trusting beliefs in an OSN provider.
B. Trust in Social Ties
Besides trust in the OSN provider (e.g., Facebook), Hoadley et. al
also highlight the importance of trust in social ties (e.g., “friends,”
“friends of friends” on Facebook, and the university’s Facebook us105
ers) in their case analysis of the Facebook News Feed privacy outcry.
When a user discloses her personal information in OSNs, the personal information moves to a collective domain where the user and her
friends in OSNs become co-owners with joint responsibilities for
106
keeping the information safe and private.
Individuals/friends on
the user’s contact list usually have a certain amount of information
access to the user’s profile and personal information may be misused
if the relationship changes. In addition, it has been recently reported
that personal details of Facebook users could potentially be breached
107
due to their friends adding applications.
That is to say, even if
104

105
106

107



D. Harrison McKnight et al., The Impact of Initial Consumer Trust on Intentions to Transact
with a Web Site: A Trust Building Model, 11 J. STRATEGIC INFO. SYS. 297, 303 (2002) (footnote omitted) (defining “trusting beliefs” as “integrity (trustee honesty and promise keeping), benevolence (trustee caring and motivation to act in the trustor’s interests), competence (ability of the trustee to do what the trustor needs), and predictability (consistency
of trustee behavior)”).
See generally Hoadley et al., supra note 4, at 58 (noting the “importance of perceived control
and ease of information access in alleviating users’ privacy concerns . . .”).
SANDRA PETRONIO, BOUNDARIES OF PRIVACY 10 (2002) (“When we are told private information by others, we enter into a contract of responsibility to be co-owners of the information.”).
Wang et al., supra note 3, at 8 (suggesting “the ability for an application to gather information about one’s friends should be another issue to be addressed. . . . If the user is not
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some users think they have tight privacy and security settings, their
personal information could be accessed and used by third-party ap108
plications due to their friends’ ignorance of privacy and security.
The need for trust in social ties arises due to the inability to monitor
other members on the network and uncertainty about their behaviors. Trust in social ties, therefore, could be an effective mechanism
to reduce the complexity of human conduct in situations where
109
people have to cope with uncertainty. Such trusting belief in social
ties may enable users to perceive that their personal information will
be co-managed appropriately by their “friends.”
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Although terms such as “invasion of privacy” and/or “privacy
breach” have been considerably hyped in the media, conceptualizations of information privacy in the context of OSNs have been somewhat patchy. In the privacy literature, there are some difficulties in
identifying common ground of information privacy, and this challenge will likely become more pronounced in the next few years. According to a 2007 study sponsored by the National Research Council,
the relationship between information privacy and society is now under pressure due to several factors that are “changing and expanding
in scale with unprecedented speed in terms of our ability to understand and contend with their implications to our world, in general,
110
and our privacy, in particular.”
Factors related to technological
change (e.g., cloud computing) and to societal trends (e.g., globalization and cross-border data flow) are combining to force a reconside111
ration of basic privacy concepts and their implications. Therefore,
rather than drawing on a single theoretical lens, this Article builds
upon previous literature from multiple theoretical lenses to create a
common understanding of Privacy 2.0 in the context of OSNs. A
theoretical framework was proposed to synthesize results of prior privacy studies, and to outline major research issues (see infra Figure 1).

108
109

110
111

diligent about setting secure privacy settings, the apps may be able to access his/her
friends’ information.”).
Id.
Niklas Luhmann, Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives, in TRUST 94, 97
(Diego Gambetta ed., 1988) (“Trust . . . presupposes a situation of risk. . . . You can avoid
taking the risk, but only if you are willing to waive the associated advantages. You do not
depend on trusting relations in the same way you depend on confidence, but trust too
can be a matter of routine and normal behaviour.”).
COMM. ON PRIVACY IN THE INFO. AGE, supra note 20, at 27.
Id. at 28 (presenting a chart summarizing large-scale factors affecting privacy).
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FIGURE 1
PROPOSED THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The proposed framework integrates the control agency theory
and identifies three privacy management strategies by linking them
with different types of control agencies: individual, proxy, and collective privacy management in the context of OSNs. Exploration of the
influences and outcomes of users’ perceived privacy is particularly
important in discussing the effectiveness of privacy management
strategies, as these are often confused in technical design, OSN providers’ data collection practices, and users’ privacy expectations. This
Article argues that an individual’s perceived privacy is better viewed
as perceived control over information release and perceived ease of
information access, with the considerations of optimistic bias. Due to
the effect of optimistic bias, users would tend to magnify the degree
of control involved in the release of their personal information, while
they often underestimate the degree of information access by others.
The impact of optimistic bias on risk perceptions of information disclosure should also not be discounted. Users on OSNs tend to demonstrate a tendency to believe that their risk levels are lower than that
of their peers.
According to the calculus lens of privacy, individuals can be expected to be rational in dealing with information sharing. Rationality
dictates that users will reveal their personal information as long as
they perceive benefits will exceed the risks of information disclosure.
The theoretical lens of privacy calculus highlights the importance of
risk appraisal and benefit calculation in an individual’s information
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disclosure behavior. However, according to the economics literature,
human agents are unable to have absolute rationality because of the
potential impacts of information processing capacity limitations and
psychological distortions on individual decision making. Users may
genuinely want to protect their personal data, but because of
bounded rationality, rather than carefully calculating long-term risks
of information disclosure, they may opt for immediate gratification
instead.
Other rational factors such as trust and information sensitivity
should also be considered as important determinants of information
withholding and information disclosure. Complete information disclosure can be expected when users trust the organization’s benevolence, integrity, and competence to protect their information. It has
been suggested in the privacy literature that information sensitivity
(i.e., the type of personal information requested by an organization)
could also influence users’ decisions to withhold or disclose their per112
sonal information.
Information such as financial data, medical
records, and personal identifiers (e.g., social security numbers) was
found to be much more sensitive than demographic characteristics,
113
purchase behavior, and lifestyle habits.
In conclusion, the main contribution of this Article is the generation of a privacy conceptual framework in the domain of OSNs, with
rich grounding in a range of multidisciplinary privacy literatures in
behavioral sciences, information systems, public policy, and social
psychology. Privacy researchers who are interested in the domain of
OSNs are likely to benefit from the theoretical framework proposed
in this Article. It identifies the factors affecting users’ decisions to
withhold and disclose information and how their privacy decision
making is influenced by these factors. Presenting a multidisciplinary
synthesis, the framework developed in this Article should be of interest to academic researchers, providers of OSNs, legislators, industry
self-regulators, and designers of privacy-enhancing technologies.
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Malhotra et al., supra note 56, at 342 (“It is known that consumers’ reactions to privacy
threats depend on the type of information requested by marketers. All things being
equal, releasing more sensitive information is perceived as more risky than releasing less
sensitive information.” (citations omitted)); Phelps et al., supra note 15, at 27 (considering the “types of personal information consumers are most and least willing to provide to
direct marketers and other retailers”).
Id. at 38 (“Consumers are least willing to provide financial and personal identifier information . . . . [M]ost respondents were willing to provide demographic, media, and lifestyle information . . . .”).

